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ccasionally m y ow n not-yet-forgotten undergradu
ate training in sem antics surfaces to remind me of the
importance of definition, particularly of words we all as
sume we understand. A word such as "M ythopoeic" is
open to a variety of definitions (to say nothing of the even
more elusive word fantasy, a word that m ay be, as the
bibliographer E. F. Bleiler writes, "alm ost all things to all
m en" (M anlove 1). Even narrowing the field to "m y
thopoeic fantasy" invites an enorm ous range of possibili
ties, including the consensus definition for this conference:
the fiction of the Inklings (J.R.R. Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, and
Charles Williams); the winners and finalists of the My
thopoeic Fantasy Award, which is given for works in the
spirit of the Inklings; and other books that are to a significant
degree like them. (Bratman)
W hile this m ay be relatively vague, it is as useful or
more useful than the standard dictionary definition of
mythopoeic as "productive of myths; m yth-m aking." This
bare-bones definition is largely un-helpful, as a m atter of
fact, because m any such fantasists do not claim to be
actively making myth; rather, they systematically incorpo
rate pre-existing m ythic patterns into their works. It would
be difficult, for example to appreciate the intricate textur
ings of a Perelandra without understanding how cultural
myth can be interwoven with story; even in a novel as
"earthbound" as That Hideous Strength, myths — both
ancient and m odem , magical and scientific — blend to
augm ent the power of Lewis's storytelling.
More recently, O rson Scott Card is among those con
tem porary writers who have explored the possibilities of
mythopoeic fiction from the perspectives of Tolkien and
Lewis. In "Fantasy and the Believing Reader," Card argues
that the essence of the fantastic is "b elief," in that the
fantastic is effective to the degree that readers become
"participatory" and em brace for the mom ent the universe
of the story— including the m yths it asserts— and allow the
story to change them. There are, he argues, three ways of
"believing" a story: epic, mythic, and critical, re-spelling
each to differentiate it from its conventional homonym:
y Epick is "all story that is received by a group as its own
story—as true o f that group. It is all story that tells who we are
as opposed to who they are."
y Mythick is "all story that is received by readers as true of
all human beings, and therefore lets each reader define him
self as like or unlike the characters in the book. It is believed
on a personal, not group level."

y C ritick is "all story that is received b y readers as
being detached from them. It defines the reader neither as
a human being nor as a m em ber of a group. Rather,
critickal readers evaluate the meaning or truth of the story
consciously, usually detaching the m eaning from the story
itself."
Epick and M ythick do not require conscious decisions to
believe; the reader sim ply accepts or rejects the fundam en
tal assumptions of the story; "T he self is nam ed by the
story, and so to doubt the story is to renam e the self."
This differentiation is central to C ard's writing, because
the approach the reader takes does ultim ately effect the
way the reader perceives the text:
Because critical readers read, not believing, but instead iden
tifying and detaching meanings from the story, they are
incapable of properly receiving a story that was written
mythickly or epickly: They cannot receive a story that was
written from belief. Likewise, mythick and epick readers,
because they believe as they do, do not usually discern and
detach meanings. The two methods are not compatible.
In addition, m any stories do not respond w ell to
critickal readings; the story breaks dow n to m ere conven
tion, particularly in fantasy:
Critics examine it and find strong-thewed heroes sav
ing damsels in distress, m agic rings and prophecies, dark
forces opposing the bright light of goodness, and the critics
say, "cardboard characters. Endless repetition of m eaning
less conventions. H ack writing. C hildish oversimplifica
tion of good and evil. Obviously written for the adolescent
mind. Wish-fulfillment. Bourgeois and fascist and sexist
and racist. Pure trash." And ah! the m ost dam ning epithet
of all: "Escapist."
But fantasy often exerts pow er over us precisely be
cause it cannot be reduced to distanced, critical statements
of meanings: sym bolic, m etaphorical, allegorical, or other
wise. Even the "dam ning epithet" is itself incorporated
into the way Card looks at such literature. N egative "es
capism " occurs, not in reading m ythopoeic fictions, but
rather in creating the distanced, dispassionate, analytical
and critical readings that sever story from reader:
The detached reader is escaping, not from that set of
fictions called reality, b ut from that m ost dangerous and
fearful of all things, the true story. The closest thing to true
com munication betw een two hum an beings is story-tell-
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ing, for despite his b est efforts at concealment, a w riter will
inevitably reveal in his story the world he believes he lives
in, and tire participatory reader w ill forever after carry
around in him self and as him self a m em ory that was partly
controlled by that other hum an being. Such m em ories are
not neatly sorted into fiction and real life in our minds. I
know, of course, that I never stood at the Cracks of Doom
and watched G ollum die. But that faith in the distinction
between m y own actions and the actions o f fictional char
acters is m erely another story I tell myself. In fact, m y
memory of that event is m uch clearer and m ore powerful
than m y m emory of m y fifth birthday.
Thus Card, like Lewis and Tolkien, ultimately depends
on M yth (with the capital "M ," to suggest those patterns
of believing that order our perceptions of the universe),
not so much to assert a m eaning or m oral as to communicate
stories that becom e m em ories that in turn touch upon
w hat he sees as the true underpinnings of those stories.
O f course, this statem ent requires that I now attempt
the im possible — at least given C ard's assertions about
the nature of reading and understanding: I must attempt
to give a Critickal reading of a writer who approaches Story
as Epick and Mythick.
Paradoxically, this attempt is m ade easier by the fact
that, while the word m ythopoeic m ight still remain vague,
abstract, even ambiguous, two of Card's three ways of
believing are fundamentally mythopoeic. Both "M ythick"
and "E pick " require a com m itm ent from the participatory
reader to coherent patterns of belief that not only inform
the story b ut that also define readers as belonging to
specific groups and sharing specific identities. Two inter
connecting "epicks" help define Card and his works: the
"Epick of M orm onism " and the "E pick of A m erica"; but
encompassing both is the m ost fundamental and farreaching of all, the "M yth of the Sacrifice."
Card has com mented that he see him self as an outsider.
Critics such as John Clute and Joe Christopher have noted
the sense of "self-containm ent" (Christopher 2) in Lewis's
works, the fact that, as an U lster Protestant b om in Catho
lic Belfast, Lewis belonged to a "surrounded but prosely
tizing faith" (Clute 244). There is a sim ilar sense of relig
ious isolation in Card. In "O n Sycam ore H ill," Card talks
about how he cam e to write two short stories in The Folk o f
the Fringe. One evening, as the rest of a workshop group left
for dinner, Card remained behind. He thought at first that he
wanted to work on his stories, but the real reason had little
to do with an unfinished story; it was in fact his awareness
that as a Mormon, he was not truly part of the group:
Ethis w asn't m y com munity. These guys were A meri
cans, not M ormons; those of us who grew up in M ormon
society and rem ain intensely involved are only nominally
members o f the A m erican community. W e can fake it, but
w e're alw ays speaking a foreign language.(9)
In a very real sense, then, portions of Card's fictions are
"epick "— Story that "is received by a group as its own
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story — as true o f that group. " W hile Card is certainly
interested in writing to as large an audience as possible,
there is a core of meaning in his work that defines the
primary group to which he perceives him self as belong
ing— these stories tell his "Epicks of M orm onism ."
Readers are often aware of generally religious im plica
tions in Card's fictions. Gareth Rees points out in an online
review of The Worthing Chronicle that the novel clearly
defines C ard's "m oral im perative" that pain and grief are
necessary for growth:
Even if, like me, you find this attitude disturbing and
reeking of hypocrisy, we must take it seriously as it is a
respectable belief within the C hristian com munity. In
deed, it is perhaps a necessary belief for people otherwise
unable to reconcile their belief in a loving and om nipotent
God with the state of the world. View ed in this way, The
Worthing Chronicle is an attempt to justify God to His
creation, a task that would tax a Milton, and it is not
surprising that Card fails.
Rees does not accept the story Card is telling and thus,
for him as reader, books such as The Worthing Chronicle fail;
yet Rees nevertheless recognizes that Card, like Milton
(and not coincidentally, Lewis), constructs stories on reli
gious bases that sim ultaneously lend them pow er and
make them liable to attack from non-believers.
Initially, religious elem ents appeared sporadically in
Card's SF/F stories, while Capitol, A Planet Called Treason,
and The Worthing Chronicle suggested generalized M or
mon references to some readers. By the early 1980s, how
ever, Card's use of the "Epick of M orm onism " became
more overt. Between July, 1982 and M arch, 1983, h e com
bined M ormon themes with the form of Lew is's The Screwtape Letters. Published in an underground new spaper to a
lim ited audience, Notes o f a Guardian A ngel (chapters 1-6),
narrated the trials and growth of a young M orm on boy,
and used Lewis's story both as a m odel and as a literary
warrant to incorporate — to borrow Lew is's phrasing —
"angels" instead of "space ships" into his fiction.
But with Seventh Son (1987), the M ythopoeic Fantasy
Award w inner in 1988, Card openly invited a m uch wider
readership to share elem ents of his own religious heritage.
This first volume of the saga of Alvin M iller in an alter
nate-universe America where magic, science, and religion
all work, re-creates as fiction the "E pick" of portions of the
Mormon past. Card so seam lessly incorporates episodes
based on the early life o f Joseph Sm ith, the first president
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, that
historical motifs becom e as integral to his story as if he had
imagined them.
Perhaps the best example of this occurs late in Seventh
Son. Young Alvin fractures his leg while trying to save a
millstone from breaking (not coincidentally, this stone is
literally "carved out of a m ountain with no han ds" and
helps establish Alvin as a "M aker"). Alvin heals his leg but
cannot heal a spot of darkness in the bone itself, the signa
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ture of the U nm aker — a figure closely allied to Lewis's
Un-man in Perelandra. Alvin realizes that the diseased spot
must be surgically excised. As his older brother Measure
prepares to operate, Alvin refuses wine to dull the pain. "I
can stand the pain and hold right still, iffen you whistle," he
assures his brother, who successfully removes the bit of bone
that otherwise would spread and kill the young Maker.
The original of this episode is one of the best known
stories in the M ormon com munity about the early life of
Joseph Smith, ideally suited to Card's purposes in Seventh
Son— to illustrate A lvin's courage, m oral intensity, and
spiritual power. Significant details are altered, but the the
power of the pattern remains, allowing Card to speak to
Mormons and non-M ormons alike in a story informed
with specific spiritual and moral values and at the same
time equally engaging as an alternate-universe fantasy.
The five-part, 1700-page H omecoming series further
develops the "Epick of M orm onism ." On the planet Har
mony, a com puter-entity, the Oversoul, manipulates the
family of N afai to leave the city of Basilica and wander for
years in the wilderness until they finally arrive at the place
where the original colonists arrived 40,000,000 years be
fore and w here their ships have remained in stasis, await
ing this moment. Activating the ships, N afai's group re
turns to Earth to re-establish humanity on their home
planet. Throughout, Card displays his hallmark creativity,
peopling both H arm ony and Earth with fully developed
cultures, both hum an and alien; generating internal and
external discords to com plicate N afai's mission; even ex-^
ploiting the com plexities of time and space as he had done
in Capitol, A Planet Called Treason, Speaker fo r the Dead, and
Xenocide.
But underlying what seem s a relatively conventional
SF plot is som ething extraordinary. Early in The Memory o f
Earth (Homecoming, Volume 1), Nafai and his brother
glance back down the road from the city gates: "If Nafai
and Issib had delayed even ten m inutes m ore they would
have had to m ake this trip in the noise and stink of horses,
donkeys, mules, and kurelom iE" (16). Kurelomi is an un
usual word, but m ost SF/Fantasy readers would willingly
accept such a nonce word used, apparently, to assert an
alien environment. M ormon readers, however, would
note that the word echoes a Book of M ormon passage
describing an "exceedingly rich" society, where individu
als owned horses, asses, and elephants, and "curelom s and
cum om s" (Ether 9:1 9 ).
Som e dozen pages later, when N afai's father describes
a vision sent by the Oversoul concerning the imminent
destruction of Basilica and ultimately of the entire planet,
there is a m oment of recognition potentially as startling as
the lamb and the lion passage at the end of The Voyage o f
the Dawn Treader. W hat W etchik describes is Lehi's vision
of the destruction of Jerusalem , taken from the Book of
Mormon. W etchik and his four sons becom e analogues to
Lehi and his four sons. The Palwashantu Index that Nafai
must kill to obtain parallels the Brass Plates of Laban. And
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from that mom ent it becom es clear that the plot m ovem ent
throughout the Homecoming Series is based explicitly on
narratives from the Book of M ormon.
If incorporating M orm onism were all that Card had
attempted in the Homecoming n ovels or the Alvin Maker
series, he would, I think, rem ain an excellent w riter work
ing on a narrow, parochial level. His just presenting M or
mon history and theology in fictionalized form would
have disturbed many readers, M orm on and non-M ormon
alike. One reviewer, in fact, warns that the Alvin Maker
series "is lifted, pretty blatantly, from the history of the
M ormon Church.Alvin M aker is sim ply Joseph Smith,
founder of the M ormon Church, and the events in the story
— from his anomalous birth, to the Red Prophet, and
onwards — are all in the original story of Sm ith's life."
Then, speaking as if all of this w ere a deeply protected
secret, the reviewer concludes, "I'd love to see how Card
wraps this all up without people beginning to notice.
("O rson Scott Card: Books")
Such com ments miss C ard's point entirely. Alvin
Miller is not just Joseph Sm ith; nothing in Joseph Sm ith's
life records suggest that he spent a year w andering the
wilderness with Tecum seh or that he was present at a
cataclysmic battle at Detroit. Nor is there anything in the
Book of M ormon to foreshadow the pivotal role of women
in the Homecoming series, or the central point that once
humans nearly destroy themselves on Earth, this planet
will be inherited by evolved rats and bats. To suggest that
all Card is doing is re-creating M orm on theology is to
argue that all Lewis does in Perelandra is to crib from
Genesis, or that Till We Have Faces is only the Cupid and
Psyche myth retold. Such assertions as m uch ignore the
power of L ewis's fiction as they miss the power of Card's.
But Card only begins here. Then he moves on to wider
im plications — to m ore expansive "ep icks" that incorpo
rate wider and wider audiences and tap into the power of
more pervasive cultural Myth.
The process is best illustrated in the Alvin M aker sto
ries. Seventh Son incorporates much that is narrowly M or
mon, but Card also suggests broader interests. Taleswapper m entions Ben Franklin's reputation as a wizard, pos
sibly even a Maker; but Franklin him self claim s that "The
only thing I ever truly m ade w as A m ericans." By "A m eri
cans" Franklin m eans m ore than just people b om in a
certain geographic location; by re-w riting Am erican his
tory, Card illuminates the inner vision of what accepting
that nam e means, justifying Talesw apper's rhetorical
question: "N ow tell me, Alvin Junior, was old Ben wrong
to say that the greatest thing he ever m ade was a single
w ord?" (Seventh Son 139)
The second volume, Red Prophet, departs alm ost en
tirely from the "M orm on E pick" of Seventh Son to concen
trate on the "Epick of A m erica" — here, the conflict be
tw een "R ed s" and "W h ites." Again, C ard's treatm ent is
consciously mythic. His "R ed s" have a direct relationship

Iss u e 81 ^ JSUCDCDGR 1 9 9 6
with the Land that no W hite can ever know, except Alvin.
This relationship intensifies the mythic relationship sug
gested in tales about "noble savages" living harmoniously
with Nature. C ard's "R ed s" feel the greensong, and
through its power, can call animals for food, run for days
without wearying, and enhance their true stewardship
over the land. Card is n o doubt aware that this version of
the story is in part historically untrue; yet he is equally
aware of the power of the m yth and capitalizes on it, just
as Lewis knew even as he was writing Out o f the Silent
Planet that there were actually no "can als" as such on Mars.
(O f Other Worlds 50). Card's "R ed s" m ay not reflect histori
cal reality in every detail, but they do reflect one popular
version of the m yth o f A m erica's beginnings.
Late in Red Prophet, the prophet, Tenskwa-Tawa,
speaks to A lvin's brother, M easure:
The bigger a man is, the more people he serves.fi A small man
serves himself. Bigger is to serve your family. Bigger is to
serve your tribe. Then your people. Biggest of all, to serve all
men, and all lands. (185)
In the Alvin Maker series, Card begins by serving his
own tribe, restructuring the story of Joseph Sm ith in a
magical universe. As the series has progressed, however,
that focus enlarges until in Red Prophet, Card emphasizes
the larger context of the A merican nation, with its prom
ises of freedom and liberty; and the third volume, Prentice
Alvin, deals explicitly with another "Epick of America,"
the struggle against slavery. W hile M ormon elem ents oc
cur, this volum e is m ore directly about w hat America can
and should be; it is about freedom and justice on all levels,
from the personal to the public. The A lvin Maker series
builds on the "Epick o f A m erica" to suggest not only lost
opportunities in the past but potentials for the present; it
is designed to elicit those remaining elements of greatness
in the American M yth of dream and belief.
The "Epick of A m erica" and the "Epick of Mormonism " sim ilarly com bine in The Folk o f the Fringe, originally
called "Tales of the M ormon Sea." Card's concern for
America-as-Myth permeates the apocalyptic dream-vi
sions of "A m erica" and the carefully crafted theatricality
of Glory o f America, perform ed in "Pageant W agon," as he
forges these two m ythic strands into one Story:
it seemed a little strange that a show called Glory o f America
should have an equal mix of Mormon and American history.
But to these people fi it was all the same story. George
Washington, Betsy Ross, Joseph Smith. Abraham Lincoln,
Brigham Young, all part of the same unfolding tale. Their
own past. (210-211)
The pageant defines the M yths that holds one com mu
nity together. Card is not proselytizing for either, neither
the truthfulness of M ormonism nor the sanctity of the
America Dream. Instead, he creates a story about commu
nity that combines these M yths into a single entity. As the
Glory o f America ends,
lithe shouting faded, the clapping became more scat
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tered. The faint audience lights came on. A few voices,
talking, began among the crowd. The applause was over.
The unity was broken. The audience was once again the
thousand citizens of Hatchvillefi.
Suddenly Deaver realized something.fiFor a while to
night they saw and heard and felt the same things. And
now they'd carry away the sam e memories, which meant
that to some degree they were the sam e person. One.
(214-215)
This is the power of Myth— the power to weld partici
pants into a single community of structured m emory and
vicarious experience. In som e cases, Card writes specifi
cally for M ormon readers who will understand the full
power of Card's images; in others, he w rites specifically
for Americans, w ho will recognize the power of the Myth
of America, regardless of how far it might diverge from
present reality; and, in stories such as "A m erica," Red
Prophet, and the H omecoming series, Card even warns
readers of dangers to the integrity of those Myths. In Red
Prophet, Tenskwa-Tawa sees an America divided, with
Reds in the west and Whites in the East. In all other visions,
the Red men dwindled, confined to tiny preserves of desolate
land, until the whole land was White, and therefore brutal
ized into submission, stripped and cut and ravished, giving
vast amounts of food that was only in imitation of the true
harvest, poisoned into life by alchemical trickery. Even the
White man suffered in those visions of the future, but it
would be many generations before he realized what he had
done. Yet here — Prophetstown — there was a day — tomor
row — when the future could be turned onto an unlikely
path, but a better one. One that would lead to a living land
after all, even if it was truncated; one that would lead some
day to a crystal city catching sunlight and turning it into
visions of truth for all who lived within it. (234)
In the vision of Tenskwa-Tawa, there is hope; in the
America of the 1990s, we already live in the hopeless,
desolate, dying land the Red Prophet struggled to avoid.
Card's exploration of mythic power extends beyond
these "Epicks" of M ormonism and of America, however.
Even earlier than his overt em bracing o f M ormonism and
America as themes, he had asserted more encompassing
mythic patterns. As the Red Prophet said, the greatest
service is to "serve all men, and all lands." Among Card's
earliest stories are a number that attempt to tell stories that
touch on some of the most im portant Stories. In "Ender's
Gam e" (1977), "K ingsm eat" (1978), "H art's Hope (1980),
and "The Porcelain Salamander" (1981), and others, Card
investigates the "M yth of the Sacrifice," the m ediator, the
advocate, the Christ-figure. These stories are sometimes
harsh and brutal, since he is concerned not simply with
easy answers but with difficult realities, particularly when
the sacrificial figure is only partially, or perhaps not at all
understood by the ones who need salvation.
The epitome of the sacrificial Christie figure in Card's
fiction is Ender Wiggin, whose very existence meets the
needs o f the larger community, and whose career as m ili
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tary genius, as itinerant interplanetary mediator and ad
vocate, as apostle to aliens, and as human link with the
generative powers of G od (emphasized in the title of the
fourth volum e, Children o f the M ind) is based on serving
larger and larger com munities. As such, these stories anat
omize the role of mediators — most often Ender Wiggin
but occasionally others as well — in an attempt at under
standing the psychological and spiritual dimensions of
sacrifice w ithin die context of Christie imagery and m ean
ing. These novels occasionally discuss God overtly but
they are essentially about atonement, sacrifice, mediation,
and their effects on community.
Episode after episode in Ender's Game resonates with
Christie, Biblical meaning, as when Ender as savior of
humanity is aided by the chosen twelve closest to him and
most capable of carrying out his mission (217); when,
following the destruction of the buggers' home planet,
Ender descends into the darkness of quasi-death for five
days, during which he sees, understands, and accepts the
consequences of his actions (330-332); and finally when,
with the defeat of hum anity's perceived enemies, he be
comes "T he child-god, the miracle worker, with life and
death in his han d s" (338). By the end of the novel, Ender
has come as close as is humanly possible to being a Christfigure, sacrificing all to save all, accepting the responsibil
ity of a billion, billion deaths (311).
In Speaker fo r the Dead, Ender is now quasi-immortal;
through time-space dilation, he has aged only a few years
while 3,000 years have passed for the rest of humanity.
Again, Ender is explicitly linked with messianic, mediational functions. To his sister's children, he is "their longlost Uncle Ender, w ho was thought in every world to be a
monster, but in reality was som ething of a savior, or a
prophet, or at least a m artyr" (88). He is the apostle to the
piggies, who recognize his Christie function. M ost signifi
cantly, he must witness the com pact between humans and
piggies by reversing his role from Ender's Game. Instead of
being the sacrifice, he must sacrifice the alien named H u
man. To Ender's bitter com m ent that he is "cold and
ruthless" enough to solidify the covenant in the only way
the piggies w ill accept, Novinha responds that he is also
"Com passionate enoughEto put the hot iron into the
wound w hen that's the only way to heal it." And, as Ender
understands, "A s one who had felt his burning iron cau
terize her deepest wounds, she had the right to speak; and
he believed her, and it eased his heart for the bloody work
ahead" (374). He perform s a passage into Life-after-Death
that Hum an and others describe in terms of miracles and
covenants, sacrament and resurrection, brotherhood and
ascent into the light (380-381,384). In the words of Bishop
Peregrino, the Speaker's interference w ith the established
structure of things on Lusitania has turned into revelation:
It was the miracle of the wafer, turned into the flesh of God in
his hands. How suddenly we find the flesh of God within us
after all, when we thought that we were only made of dust. (385)
Even before Xenocide was published, Card acknow

ledged that the sequel to Speaker fo r the Dead would be
difficult to write:
it will be even more different from the first two than Speaker
was from Ender. It's cosmic Sci-Fi — discovering what ev
erything is made of, what underlies the laws of the universe,
that sort of thing. (Shirk 12)
"C osm ic Sci-Fi" — he sam e kind of Story that Lewis
weaves in the Ransom novels, as we gradually understand
the connections among all things w ithin the Fields of
Arbol, through M aleldil as creator. C ard's discussions of
philotes and philotic webs seem intended less as scientific,
extrapolative suggestions about the actual functioning of
universe and m eta-universe than as metaphorical ways of
defining the underlying M yth of creation and generation
that shape his stories, especially the Story of Ender Wiggin,
"som etim es monster, always som ething of a savior, or a
prophet, or at least a m artyr."
To varying degrees, C ard's readership has responded
to the power of Myth as it percolates through the Stories
that em bodies it. Yet the sam e acknowledgem ent of
mythic power also makes these novels vulnerable to at
tack. As happens occasionally in Lewis studies, critics who
do not accept C ard's M yths as true may have difficulty
accepting the Stories Card uses to define them, as when
the Ender novels are rejected as neo-Hitlerian, m ale-ori
ented power-fantasies perpetrated by a m isogynistic, my
opic, militaristic anti-fem inist (Radford); or when A
Woman o f Destiny is written off as a predictably formulaic
romance (Quaglia). But for readers open to the Myths
these writers explore, the Stories becom e things of enor
mous potential. A nd, in their ow n way, the M yths becom e
means by which more difficult books can be approached
and understood.
Much like Lewis's That Hideous Strength, C ard's most
recent single-volum e novel has elicited strong criticism for
doing what it should not and for not doing w hat it appar
ently should. Yet, when one looks at it closely, Lost Boys
(1992) is a logical conclusion thus far to C ard's interlocking
approach to three essential M ythic patterns.
Lost Boys seem s on the surface a far cry from my
thopoeic fantasy. In fact, m ost of it seem s barely fantastic
at all; only in the final pages does C ard leave the world as
we know it and enter another world, where M yth becomes
Reality; but even there, he m akes it clear that term s such
as fantasy and reality are only relative in this novel. As Step
Fletcher says about his son's apparent problem s facing
reality, "It's the real world that h e's living in, only just as
we thought, he sees it m ore deeply and truly than the rest
of us" (376). In addition, long portions of the novel discuss
the m undane concerns of m aking a living, of defining
relationships, both family and social, of hom e and school
and job. One reader w rites that the novel is sim ply about
a "struggling com puter program m er with a strong religiousEbackground and a son who is having weird exper
iences with video games. I really was caught up in the trials
and tribulations of the program m er's life, but the subplot
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of the boy is always kinda [sic] creepy in the background"
("Bob's Books"). A nother reviewer, summarizes the novel
as being about "a family w ho lose a difficult child to a
murderer, but w hen he com es back as a ghost they are able
to give him the perfect Christmas he never had when he
was alive" (Rees).
Both responses are fundamentally inaccurate. Stevie's
story is not a quirky sub-plot; it is the rationale for the
entire novel, with Step Fletcher's difficulties at w ork de
fining one of several reasons w hy Step is unable to rescue
his son until too late. The novel discusses Mormons and
Mormonism, but not in the sense that its purpose is to
convince readers that M orm onism is true; instead, religion
illuminates Stevie's decisions, particularly his need to stop
a vicious, spreading evil. And the Fletchers do not merely
give Stevie "the perfect Christm as he n ever had when he
was alive" (which is sim ply false to the novel); but rather
their child finds the strength to bring one final, nearly
"perfect" Christm as to the families of a killer's innocent
victims. By rejecting Card's underlying M yths, these read
ers miss the power of the novel. It becomes merely, as one
reader said recently, a very sad book.
The case is com plicated by the fact the short story "Lost
Boys" is a radically different story than the novel. This
becomes im mediately apparent in the tone of the original
opening paragraphs:
Kristine and the kids and I moved to Greensboro on the
first o f March, 1 9 8 3 .1 w as happy enough about my job— I
just w asn't sure I wanted a job at all. But the recession had
the publishers all panicky, and nobody was com ing up
with advances large enough to take a decent amount of
time writing a novel. I suppose I could whip out 75,000
words of junk fiction every m onth and publish them under
half a dozen pseudonym s or something, but it seemed to
Kristine and m e that w e'd do better in the long run if I got
a job to ride out the recession. Besides, my Ph.D. was down
the toilet. I'd been doing good work at N otre Dame, but
when I had to take out a few weeks in the middle of a
semester to finish Hart's Hope, the English department was
about as understanding as you'd expect from people who
prefer their authors dead or domesticated. C an't feed your
family? So sorry. Y ou're a writer? Ah, but not that any
one's written a scholarly essay about. So long, boy-oh!
("Lost Boys" 73-74)
This does not sound like the opening to a fiction; this is
Orson Scott Card talking about his own life, his own
family, his ow n frustrations. The story continues in this
way for several m ore paragraphs, providing insights into
Card's biography. Only w ith the introduction of an oldest
child, "Scotty," does the story assert itself as fiction; Scotty
is the vehicle by which Card tells a Story that is, in essence,
his own "E pick," his ow n Myth.
W hen he took the story to the Sycam ore Hill Writers
Workshop, it was sharply criticized. Card quotes Karen
Fowler as saying, "B y telling this story in first person with
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so much detail from your own life, you've appropriated
something that doesn't belong to you. You've pretended
to feel the grief o f a parent who has lost a child, and you
don't have a right to feel that grief" ("Lost Boys" 89).
Card's response is that "Lost Boys" contains a private
Myth. Responding to Fow ler's comments, Card discov
ered that
This story wasn't about a fictional eldest child named
"Scotty." It was about my real-life youngest child, Charlie Ben.
Charlie, who in the five and a half years of his life has
never been able to speak a word to us. Charlie, who could
not smile at us until he was a year old, who could not hug us
until he was four, who still spends his days and nights in
stillness, staying wherever we put him, able to wriggle but
not to run, able to call outbutnot to speak, able to understand
that he cannot do what his brother and sister do, but not to
ask us why. In short, a child who is not dead and yet can
barely taste life despite all our love and all our yearning.
Yet in all the years of Charlie's life, until that day at
Sycamore Hill, I had never shed a single tear for him, never
allowed myself to grieve. I had worn a m ask of calm and
acceptance so convincing that I had believed it myself.E A
story that I had fancied was a mere lark, a dalliance in the
quaint old ghost-story tradition, was the m ost personal,
painful story of m y career — and, unconsciously, I had
confessed as much by making it by far the m ost autobio
graphical of my works. ("Lost B oys" 90)
The story added a new dim ension to Card's use of
Myth by allowing him to include him self directly in con
fronting a truth that defines his life as a father.
W hen Card expanded the story into a novel, that pri
vate myth retreated. Step and DeAnne Fletcher replaced
Scott and Kristine; Stevie, Robbie, and Betsy replaced
"Scotty," Geoffrey, and Emily; the new child was Jeremy
Zapata Fletcher instead of Charlie Ben. But Lost Boys re
tained touches of Card's private Story. The Cards moved
to Greensboro, N orth Carolina, while the Fletchers moved
to Steuben, N orth Carolina; but significantly the Fletchers
set out from Vigor, Illinois— echoing Vigor Church near
the Hatrack River area that Card used as a landscape for
the Alvin Maker novels. Even as Card removes Orson
Scott Card as character from the story, he replaced him
with allusions to Orson Scott Card, author of other books
that begin the process of exploration and discovery con
tinued in Lost Boys.
Beyond this personal level, Lost Boys also illustrates
Card's three consistent themes. The "Epick of M ormon
ism " is specifically represented. Throughout, Card pro
vides his insights into the practical, everyday workings of
a religion that, for him, is the focus of his life and his
family's lives. He is so persistent in providing these details
that it is easy to see why readers m ight feel that he is
proselytizing; but the M ormon references are so functional,
so integrated to the narrative that re-reading the short-story
version, where religion is rarely mentioned, reveals a thin
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ness that mere word count cannot explain. For Step and
DeAnne Fletcher, religion is real. Blessings work. Proph
ecy is possible. Prayers can be answered, although not
always in the ways one might either wish or expect.
Thus, they of all people should be prepared when
Scotty's life is touched by transcendence. Yet initially they
fail their ow n beliefs. In That Hideous Strength, Lewis's
Mother Dimble can kneel in evening prayer, before a near
stranger, without any em barrassment; Card's Step finds it
more difficult to do so. And in spite of their frequent
contact with the spiritual, both Step and DeAnne persist
on defining Stevie's "problem " in secular terms, including
sending him to a psychiatrist, only to find that Dr. Weeks
wants to cure Stevie of his religion, since she sees it as
fostering an unhealthy m ental state; yet she encourages
her own son to associate with the Mormons, since among
them his obsession with obtaining invisible powers and
becoming a god will pass (she hopes) relatively unnoticed.
Still, the M ormonism remains secondary to other con
cerns. The novel is set in contemporary America. If in Red
Prophet Tenskwa-Tawa has a horrific vision of a land poi
soned and dying, devastated by the W hites, Step Fletcher
lives in that vision. He brings his pregnant wife to a town
enveloped by fumes from nearby tobacco factories;
DeAnne constantly battles nausea because of the stench.
His hom e is invaded several times by hordes of in
sects—june bugs, spiders, roaches; each time, the insects
are seeking to escape a violation of the land as the killer
buries yet another young victim in the dirt beneath the
Fletcher's home. Even the steps taken to rid the house of
the insects are themselves poisonous, the residue of the
insecticide forcing the Fletchers out of their house and
ironically inviting the killer inside.
And, most tragic of all, their world is a world of decep
tion, greed, anger, and evil. A fellow Mormon, who should
have provided strength and support for the new family in
the area, perverts religion to her own end, frightening
young Stevie with self-serving "prophecies" and false
"blessings." The teacher who should have helped Stevie
develop ties with his new com munity ridicules him to
bolster her own self-importance. A young m an who offers
to babysit the Fletchers' children turns out to be a sex
offender so near being a mere "creatu re" that Step hesi
tates even to speak his children's nam es when the man can
hear. And, of course, at the center of the plot is the serial
killer, the m urderer of young boys, whose actions impel
Stevie's need to redeem the killer's victims.
This is the America of reality, a place where Myth
dissipates, a place already well on the way to the devasta
tion and defeat that opens The Folk o f the Fringe. Yet even
here there are remnants of hope: new-found friends pro
vide com fort and com munity; and by believing the unbe
lievable, a police investigator confirms the meaning of
Stevie's sacrifice. In the end, the place that saw the difficult
birth of one son and the death another becomes the com
munity the Fletchers had been seeking:
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Step and DeAnne buried their oldest boy in a cem etery
on the western edge of Steuben, surrounded by thick
woods full of birds and animals, a living place. They both
knew as they stood beside the grave that their days of
wandering were through. They had been anchored now in
Steuben, both by the living and the dead. Little Jeremy
would enter Open Doors [Clinic] when the time came;
flowers would be tended on this grave. (447)
If Lost Boys remained m erely an extended version of
one m an's private story, a story about the workings of a
specific religion, or even a story about w hat A m erica has
become, then the novel would indeed be ju st "a very sad
story." But there is more. C ard's works, no matter how
terrible, frightening, sad, or even apparently inconclusive
struggle to m ove beyond the family, the tribe, even the
people, to "serve all men, and all lands," and Lost Boys is
no exception. This novel works because each level is an
inherent part of som ething larger. And structuring the
story is the M yth of Sacrifice.
Stevie is not just a "problem child" w ho sees im aginary
friends, plays phantom video gam es, and ignores his par
ents. He is a vehicle by which Card can m ourn his own
"lost b oy"— yes: but on a much larger scale, he is an icon
for innocence and purity; as Detective Douglas says:
there's som e people who do things so bad it tears at the
fabric of the world, and then there's som e people so sweet
and good that they can feel it when the w orld gets torn.
They see things, they know things, only they're so good
and pure that they d on't understand what it is that they're
seeing. I think that's w hat's been happening to your boy.
W hat's going on here in Steuben is so evil and he is so good
and pure that he can't help but feel it. The minute he got
to Steuben he m ust have felt it, and it m ade him sadE. The
rest of us, we've got good and evil m ixed up in us, and our
own badness makes so much noise we can't hear the evil
of the monster out there. But your Stevie, he can hear it.
He can hear the nam es of the boys [and]£ your Stevie takes
these nam es, and he makes friends out o f them. (374)
Douglas is close to the truth, but even he does not fully
understand that Stevie achieves m ore than ju st nam ing the
lost boys. In a clim actic exchange, Step threatens to ban
Stevie from the computer, Stevie's m ain connection with
the lost boys. "You can 't," Stevie cried, "T h at's the only
thing they're staying for! If I can't play th ey'll go aw ay!"
(410). Step answers that m aybe the boy is spending en
tirely too much time playing Atari.
"Not as much as you spend on the IBM in there," said Stevie.
"That happens to be my work," said Step. "That happens
to be what pays for our house and our food and Zap's doctor
bills."
"Are you the only one in the family who has work to
do?" Stevie demanded. (411)
Several pages later, DeAnne m akes the correct connec
tion, even though neither she nor Step understands it
completely:
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"The funniest thing," said DeAnne. "You know when he said,
UYou're not the only one with work to do?' or whatever it
was he said?"
"Yeah, I didn't know whether to be delighted to see him
showing so much emotion or appalled that for the first time
in his life he was yelling at his father."
"Do you know what went through my head when he said
that?" said DeAnne. "I thought, OWist ye not that I must be
about my father's business?'" (412-413)
At this point Lost Boys ceases to be m erely a sad book
and becomes a powerful one, because Stevie is pure and
good and perceives the tear in the w orld£and he has the
courage to act to stop it. Through his courage, he can hold
onto the lost boys long enough to teach them one thing that
brings hope out of tragedy: how to be seen.
It is not an accident that the story closes on Christmas,
nor is it as one reader suggests a "schm alzy" manipulative
ploy on C ard's part (Rees), any m ore than it is a schmalzy
m anipulative ploy on Lew is's part to signal the collapse of
the W hite W itch's power by the appearance of Father
Christm as. Instead, at the season of Birth and Hope, the
lost boys both give and receive a final gift:
As Bappy [the killer] was led away, as the bodies were
brought out of their hidden graves and under the police
lights of that bitter cold Christm as Eve, one by one the boys
inside the house no longer had the strength or the need to
keep trying anymore, and they said good-bye, and they
were gone. One mom ent there, the next m oment not there.
Then their parents left, weeping, clinging to each other,
with just a whispered word or two from Douglas. "T ell no
one," he said. "Y ou d on't want your boy's nam e in the
press. Just go hom e and thank God you had a chance to
say good-bye. One sm all m ercy in this whole cruel busi
ness." And the parents nodded and agreed and went home
to the loneliest C hristm as of their lives, the Christmas in
which questions were answered at last, and love was
remembered and w ept for, and God was thanked and
blamed for not having done more. (442)
This is a tremendous weight for one boy, one Story, to
bear; and Card's control comes perilously close to breaking.
Yet I think that control does hold; the story does ultimate
imitate the deeper, brighter Story that Card wants to tell.
There may in fact be "m onsters in the m all" — evil close to
us, unseen and unidentifiable except for its consequences;
but there are also those willing to sacrifice in order to bring
that evil into the light and defeat it. Card gives us the
externals— an apparently disturbed child, whose parents
struggle to find clues as to how to cure him— with the
resolution only becoming fully understandable at the end
of the story. W ith Stevie's parents, readers are invited to
watch him make difficult decisions; yet the readers do not
understand his preliminary decisions any more than Step
and DeAnne do. The intensity and power of Stevie's sacri
fice requires that it be revealed at precisely the correct
moment, transforming what had seemed to be a "realistic"
novel into a deeply "m ythopoeic" one.
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In speaking about the eucatastrophe of fairy stories,
Tolkien provides a paradigm for the final effect o f a story
such as Lost Boys:
The consolation of fairy-stories, the joy of the happy
ending: or more correctly o f the good catastrophe, the sud
den joyous "turn" (for there is no true end to any fairy-tale):
this joy, which is one of the things which fairy-stories can
produce supremely well, is not essentially "escapist," nor
"fugitive." In its fairy-tale — or otherworld — setting, it is a
sudden and miraculous grace: never to be counted on to
recur. It does not deny the existence of dyscatastrophe, of
sorrow and failure: the possibility of these is necessary to the
joy of deliverance; it denies (in the face of much evidence, if
you will) universal final defeat and in so far is evangelium,
giving a fleeting glimpse of Joy, Joy beyond the walls of the
world, poignant as grief. ("O n Fairy Stories" 68)
In its final pages, Card's text em phasizes the effects of
this pattern: the sudden "tu rn " that, far from providing
em otional closure, reveals that on m ore fundamentally
mythic levels, the story opens outward, inviting readers
"farther in and farther up"; the "sudden and miraculous
grace" that brings consolation by intruding the supernat
ural into the frighteningly real world C ard has re-created,
a world of serial killers and missing children. And the final
paragraphs of Lost Boys provides precisely the em otional
response that Tolkien defines:
It is the m ark of a good fairy-story, of the higher or
more complete kind, that however wild its events, how
ever fantastic or terrible the adventures, it can give to the
child or man that hears it, when the "tu rn " comes, a catch
of the breath, a beat and lifting of the heart, near to (or
indeed accompanied by) tears, as keen as that given by any
form of literary art. ("O n Fairy Stories" 68-69)

Appendix: Fantasy and the Believing Reader
For the last half-century English-language literary criti
cism has been captured by a system of belief called M od
ernism or, in its later permutations, N ew Criticism. If
literary criticism were merely a club for people w ho think
they understand Ezra Pound, there would be no reason for
fantasy writers and readers to take it into account. Unfor
tunately, however, this particular school of literary criti
cism has acquired the status, in too many minds, of Truth.
Too many writers, eager to understand w hat it is that
makes their stories happen, have learned to say "classi
cism " and "Rom anticism "as if H ulm e's use of the words
made any sense; to speak contemptuously of "naive identification"and the "pathetic fallacy"; and to discuss their
own work as if the reason for writing stories were to
convey meanings in such a way that only a trained reader
can receive them— and the untrained reader can receive
nothing at all. With more and more fantasy writers being
affected by this critical movement, and more and more
critics turning their techniques to fantasy, it is time that
this school of literary criticism were put in perspective in
relation to fantasy stories.
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Authority for Belief
Literary criticism is the stories we tell ourselves about
our stories. W hen we speak of a literary w ork's "m eaning"w e m ay be telling a story about how the author in
tended the word to be read, how the proper audience of
the work would have understood it, how the work is
received by a m odem audience, what the work tells us
about the author and his com munity or even how we think
the work should have been written and how it compares
to that standard of measurement. In all cases, however, we
are telling a story— that is, we are giving an ordered ac
count of causally related events.
By tacit agreement we believe our literary stories in one
way, as fiction, and our critical stories another way, as
history. N o one would attempt to prove that, say, Hamlet
is "tru e"or "false,"though we regard it as being a truthful
play. No one would dream of criticizing Shakespeare's
writing of the play because Claudius didn't "really' kill
H am let's father. The center of belief in fiction is in the
author's assertions of causal relationships— from this
there is no appeal. On the other hand, when Stephen
Dedalus argues that Hamlet is Shakespeare's working out
of his own psychological problems caused by the death of
his son H amnet, w e can protest that this argument is false
or invalid or not justified by the evidence. The center of
belief in criticism is historical — the ultimate authority
from which there is no appeal is the "real"event. Since, of
course, the "reaT'event is forever unascertainable, w e can
quarrel forever about proof in criticism (and all history).
W hat does Hamlet really mean? Is the story we tell about
Hamlet true or false. In the meantime, however, while we
may assert that Stephen Dedalus's account of Hamlet is
false, we cannot say meaningfully that it is "tru e"or
"false"that Dedalus said it, for Dedalus exists as a charac
ter in fiction and if Joyce tells us Dedalus said it, we must
accept this without appeal, unless Joyce him self gives us
reason w ithin the text to doubt his own statement.
This distinction between fictional and historical centers
of belief is rarely clearcut, however. H istorical and realistic
fiction both im ply som e appeal to the historical center of
belief, for example. In earlier times, writers and readers
were not so fussy about w hat must be justified by "reality"and what m ight be authoritatively invented by the
writer. W here an individual w riter and his audience place
themselves on that continuum varies from work to work,
even from paragraph to paragraph, and individual read
ers, too, will bestow or withdraw authority from a story
on a historical or fictional basis depending on their own
expectations and experience.

Ways of Believing
W hen a w riter tells a story to his com munity, he will,
consciously or not, assume that the com munity will define
itself in relation to the story. I have noticed differences in
the way I believe stories, whether fictional or historical,
and for clarity I distinguish three general types of belief:
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epic, mythic, and critical. These nam es are not arbitrarily
chosen — I m ean them to resonate with m any old inten
sions and contrast with m any old extensions of the words.
H owever, they are not p arallel terms, and I w ish them to
be; and since I w ill use them in a restricted and in some
ways arbitrary way, right alongside the m ore traditional
meanings, I will risk annoying you with affectation and
will distinguish these special senses and odd gramm atical
uses of the words with etym ologically unjustifiable but
visually parallel spelling changes.
Epick is all story that is received by a group as its own
story— as true o f that group. It is all story that tells who zve
are as opposed to who they are. M ost of the Old Testament
was originally written and read epickly, because the audi
ence was the people of the book. They received it as an
account of how we came out of Egypt, how we prospered
or declined according with our obedience to or rebellion
against God.
M ythick is all story that is received by readers as true
of all hum an beings, and therefore lets each reader define
him self as like or unlike the characters in the book. It is
believed on a personal, not group level.
Epick and m ythick are alike, how ever, in this: The
decision about w hether or not to believe is not consciously
made. The story sim ply is or is not true. The self is nam ed
by the story, and so to doubt the story is to rename the self.
Critick is all story that is received b y readers as being
detached from them. It defines the reader neither as a human
being nor as a member of a group. Rather, critickal readers
evaluate the meaning or truth of the story consciously, usu
ally detaching the meaning from the story itself.
Because critical readers read, not believing, but instead
identifying and detaching m eanings from the story, they
are incapable of properly receiving a story that was written
mythickly or epickly: They cannot receive a story that was
written from belief. Likewise, m ythick and epick readers,
because they believe as they read, do not usually discern
and detach meanings. The two m ethods are not com pat
ible. Once I have treated a story critickly, I am n o longer
capable of treating it mythickly or epickly; I can only
pretend to do so, or tell m yself a story about w hat it was
like when I was capable of participatory reading.

Criticism as Story
Because criticism is also telling stories, how ever, it is
im portant to remem ber that a critic can be treating a
literary w ork one way and treating his ow n story about
that work in another. Critics generally read all literary
works critickly, which leads to attempts to decode Faerie
Queene, map Ulysses, patronize the naivete of Edgar Rice
Burroughs, or despise the superficiality of Pope. The critic
almost invariably believes his ow n story about these
works. Only a few critics in each generation are able to
write their criticism critickly, to detach themselves from
their own stories about stories.
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A t the mom ent I seem to be functioning as a critickal
critic, for I am aware that m y definitions, m y nam ing, my
stories about stories about stories are all artificial con
structs and not "tru e,"bu t m erely useful. However, this
account of m y own attitude is also a story and to be
critickal I m ust call it into question, because in fact I would
not write these ideas if I ( i d not, at som e point along the
way, believe in them. I at least believe in my unbelief,
which certainly nam es m e as a believer. W hich could bring
m e to paradox if it were not for the fact that part of the
story that I tell is that belief is, at som e point, inescapable.
W hoever detaches him self from one story and ceases to
nam e him self in relation to it invariably attaches to another
story, if only the story that he is now detached.
O f course you see where this leads. Coleridge and
W ordsworth m ust define themselves as different from
their predecessors and yet identify themselves as belong
ing in the sam e com pany. They are Milton, but they are
not-Milton, ju st as a child nam es him self as M other and
not-Mother. They treat their predecessors' stories critickly,
detaching themselves from those stories. They replace
them with their ow n epick story, which they believe and
which accounts for their predecessors and themselves and
sets the world in order. T. S. Eliot and others m ust repeat
the task, endlessly redefining themselves. It is the univer
sal pattern of all writers that they must both identify
themselves w ith and distinguish themselves from their
predecessors.
Yet this account (an oversimplification of Bloom) is also
a story. It is epick to those who believe it as a true account
of how we (literateurs) work. It is m ythick to those who
believe that this process of nam ing through doubting old
stories and telling new ones is universal.
Those who tell themselves the story that naive
(mythickal or epickal) belief is primitive, while detached,
critickal understanding is m ore advanced, are inevitably
disturbed by this circularity, for if the critickal view is
"better"or m ore elevated, this account of it makes true
critick forever as unapproachable as true reality. The fully
detached stance is im possible, because the detached stance
itself requires belief in detachment.
But this is not disturbing to those who believe that only
a small num ber of our stories can be received critickly. We
could not live if w e w ere critickal about even a small
fraction of the stories we are told. The critic who no longer
believes the capitalist story probably still believes the
mythick stories of gravity, hum anity and fair play. The
critic who no longer believes in the Bible epickly or
mythickly probably still believes in the objective reality of
bread and the causal relationship between chewing, swal
lowing and surviving. Because the critickal view is only
possible to the unbeliever, and all thought and language
depend ultimately upon unquestioned belief in something
at some point, to regard the critickal view as divine is to
consign oneself forever to hell.
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The Critic's Tale
The novel began as a rebellion against romance. Ro
mance, which had been the soul of an age in w hich real
knights shed real blood, no longer satisfied uncourtly
writers, who turned to w riting romances about their con
temporaries and called them "new "rom ances, or novels.
The novel caught on, not because it appealed to intellectu
als, b ut because ordinary readers loved it.
Since then, however, the novel has been captured by
another story, a critical tale o f self-existing texts, in which
it is praiseworthy to put distance betw een the reader and
the story, in which it is forbidden for a "good"reader to
identify with a character or consider his own experience
of the novel as anything more than the "pathetic fallacy."
All that was valuable in novels was that w hich was pub
licly verifiable. In this way criticism could approach the
absolute correctness of science, in w hich only repeatable
public experience is regarded as valid.
Literateurs found this m ethod exciting and productive,
and so they believed it and started acting it out. They kept
their distance from the texts they read, and instead ana
lyzed, breaking stories into pieces, discovering connec
tions betw een them, and then writing elaborate discursive
paraphrases o f the "m eaning"of this or that great w ork of
literature. The result was the creation of a special priest
hood of correct readers, together building a tow er of sto
ries about stories which, presum ably, would take them to
heaven.
The result was sometimes absurdity, as when scholars
who did not believe in M ilton's God thought they could
understand M ilton's work. And as these priests of de
tached and transcendental reading told each other more
and more stories about stories, writers began to believe
them and write fiction for them. Such fiction was no longer
written to be believed. It was written to b e analyzed and
translated into discourse, and the only story that was
believed anymore was the epick tale of the pure-minded
critic, who, using absolute standards, officially given him
by observation but actually given him by God, decided
w hat was good and what was bad in fiction. Trembling,
the writers who believed in this story awaited the verdict
of the critics, who sometimes turned their thumbs upward,
but more often proved their power by destroying the poor
supplicant w ith his first novel.
Unfortunately, the majority of literature in the world
does not fit this critical method. W hen m ost stories are
analyzed, they break down into a jum ble of m eaningless
fragments that seem almost interchangeable with the frag
ments of every other such story. To the critic who guards
the temple doors, such tales are plainly unworthy offer
ings at the altar, for they cannot be consumed by the
hungry horde of priests behind the curtain. It is dust on
their tongues.
Fantasy is one such sort of writing. Critics examine it
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and find strong-thewed heroes saving damsels in distress,
magic rings and prophecies, dark forces opposing the bright
light of goodness, and the critics say, "cardboard characters.
Endless repetition of meaningless conventions. Hack writ
ing. Childish oversimplification of good and evil. Obviously
written for the adolescent mind. Wish-fulfillment. Bourgeois
and fascist and sexist and racist. Pure trash." And ah! the
most damning epithet of all: "Escapist."
The bourgeois, unpriestly reader leaves his dull world
of work and worry and escapes to a land of magic, where
good and evil are clearly separated, w here he can pretend
that he is the strong and fearless hero, where he doesn't
have to cope with reality. And since this reader does not
read deciphering meanings from the text, he is obviously
not seeking truth, but rather avoiding thought. Only the
stupid or the lazy read it.
Thus the critic-priests tell a story about fantasy that
explains away their inability to apply their method to it.
Any work that cannot be coped with is disposed of. And
so the critics have created their epick tale of good literature
clearly separated from bad literature, in which a few
strong, heroic writers and critics stand against the evil,
swarming masses of subhuman intellect, hewing the mon
sters Fantasy, M ystery, Science Fiction, Gothic, Historical,
in order to rescue the virgin damsel Truth and take her
safely home, where she m ay be raped at will.
The tragedy is not that so many critics believe this story
and act it out, dressing up in their tweeds and sweaters to
go quarrel about minor points of doctrine at MLA and
other conferences. The tragedy is that those who are con
demned by them, excluded by them, also tend to believe
this story, and regard themselves as second-class citizens.
The result is that they either apologize for the stories they
love, deny those stories, or try pathetically to make those
stories fit the standards of the critic-priests, who occasion
ally, grudgingly, admit such works into the canon of minor
works. But only after the "m eaning"of the work has been
safely detached and translated into discourse. And occa
sionally a work of fantasy is so important that it cannot be
ignored. Then the critics m ust work over the story unbid
den, getting it under control as quickly and thoroughly as
possible, lest too many readers discover that they have had
a powerful experience that was far better than anything
the critic-priest ever gave them.
W e can see this process at work with The Lord o f the
Rings. The book was written by a formidable scholar, but
he was not a critic-priest. He was a lover of old stories that
were told back when people willingly sat open-mouthed
listening to tales of heroes. Saga, epic, myth, fairy tales —
and Tolkien set out to write just such a story. He declared
again and again that he detested allegory in all its forms,
including modem symbolism. He was not writing meanings.
He was telling a story. Of course, the critic-priests already
have an answer to that. Never listen to the writer, they say.
Only examine the text. Writers have an embarrassing way of
scoffing at the critic's interpretations. The text, however,
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submits silently to torture and dismemberment.
In Lord o f the Rings, the three characters of Frodo, Sam
and Gollum are really three aspects of a single character.
Frodo is the superego, Sam the ego, G ollum the id. We
have the story firmly under control, for w e have renamed
the characters to place them within a non-threatening tale.
Or try this: The scene at the Cracks of Doom is the
temptation of Christ. The ring is Satan. Frodo is the sin of
pride, succumbing to Satan's offer of all the kingdoms of
the world. Gollum is the sins of the flesh, who used the
ring for murder, theft and catching fish, and finally, in the
scene at the Cracks of Doom, it is no accident that Gollum
bites o ff Frodo's fin ger and then, in his trium ph, dances his
way backward into the fires of hell. Gluttony destroyed
itself and Frodo, as the w ill to power, survived only be
cause he was broken and maimed. O nly Sam wise, the
person who was, significantly, untouched by the power of
the ring, emerges unscathed. And so we have an allegori
cal reading which can be extended quite interestingly
throughout the work.
We can search the Lord o f the Rings for patterns of
imagery; we can decipher the m eaning of the different
races; we can talk at great length about the bourgeois
virtues affirmed by the scouring of the Shire, and argue
about whether Sam or Frodo was the figure m ost re
warded. Yet is any of this what m ade Lord o f the Rings a
powerful experience to millions of readers?
Already, however, albeit with the best intentions in the
world, Lord o f the Rings is being required in college courses
and is undergoing just such critical treatments. I do not
resent this because there is som ething inherently bad
about critickal reading. On the contrary, there is an excite
ment to the rituals of criticism. It is an em otional experi
ence to take pieces of the broken-up text and assemble
them in a meaningful pattern. It is, in fact, a valid creative
act to tell such stories about stories, and I think this is why
the critic-priests have survived so long. Anyone who has
read the rhapsodies of Frank Kermode or the great sagas
of Northrop Frye knows that within the com munity of
critic-priests there are powerful, true-seeming tales.
The danger is not the fashionable critics' tale-telling,
but in their insistence that these stories about stories be
believed, not as fictions, but as objectively true history. And
most critical com mentary is as helpful in understanding
stories as Genesis is in understanding the origins of life. It
is very lovely, but it doesn't account very w ell for all those
fossils. The epickal stories of the critic-priests, however
exciting they are in their own right, do not even begin to
explain what really happens in the experience of partici
patory reading.
Fantasy cannot be read critickly. It cannot be translated
into discourse. Its fit reader cannot rem ain aloof and de
tached from the story, searching for m eanings in the inter
stices of the tale. The fit reader of fantasy is not a spectator
but a participant. Mythickly or epickly, the fit reader of
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fantasy attempts to believe, and if he does not believe, it is
because he and the writer cannot com fortably dwell in the
sam e unconscious world, no t because fantasy itself is by
nature unworthy.

The Act Of Reading
In a sense, all reading is participatory in that it requires
the reader to follow along the sentences and apprehend
the words. Readers are trained to recognize discrete sym
bols as letters, and discrete groups of sym bols as words.
The very fact that words are separated b y neat little spaces,
and sentences by universally agreed-upon marks, carries
its ow n meaning. But readers do not think about the
symbols they are reading while they are reading. They
sim ply receive them , and unconsciously sort them out.
Each sym bol-group arouses its ow n set of responses in the
reader; but even then, it is n ot the w ords w e read, but the
relationships betw een the words. O f m eans nothing by
itself. But add m ore and m ore words, and o/becomes ripe;
a reader receives o f differently because of its context, and
receives everything else in the sentence differently be
cause o f is there.
In receiving stories, we go through a sim ilar process. We
are told of certain events, with a certain pattern of causal
relationships am ong those events. Each event changes our
view of all other events. And, as with reading letters and
words, the overwhelm ing majority of those changes, those
relationships among events, are conceived unconsciously,
uncontrolledly, and we never notice them at all.
This model of how we receive stories is remarkably
similar to how we receive the events of our own lives.
Things happen; we act, others act. Each event is uncon
sciously assigned a causal relationship— either intentional,
mechanical or random — to all other events. And from all
this we develop the unconscious but unquestioningly be
lieved story of die world that makes us who we are. W e call
this "real life"as opposed to fiction, but in fact our own lives
are merely stories we have unconsciously told ourselves
about events. O ur self exists only in our m emory.
But it is m ore com plex than this. W e also hear the
stories other people tell us about ourselves and about
themselves. A child, engrossed in play, perform s a socially
unacceptable behavior in his pants; his mother, who be
lieves certain tales about such things, says, "T hat's so
filthy ,"and the child believes. "Y o u are so dum b,"and we
believe. "Y ou are so beautiful,"and we believe. O ur very
self is constantly being revised according to our experience
and the stories others tell us.
This works in the other direction too. W e are constantly
revising our experiences according to that set of uncon
scious beliefs we call our "self." W e believe som e stories,
we doubt others; we unconsciously decide some experi
ences are im portant and rem em ber them, and decide oth
ers are trivial and forget them. Thus our self edits our
experience of the world, and our experience of the world
revises ourself in unm easurable, unaccountable ways.
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This is how we read, except that the events of the story
have already been edited by another person. The author's
absolute control over the written text translates into a great
deal of control over our ordering of the events in the story.
W e edit the story unconsciously as we read, deciding what
is im portant and what is trivial, w hat is true and what is
false, but to a considerable degree we w ill still be influ
enced by the shapes the w riter has im posed on the tale.
Furtherm ore, the w riter's shaping of the w ork is also
unconscious to a greater degree than critical theorists
would like to admit. Even writers w ho follow a tight plan,
controlling, as they think, every word, every gesture of a
character, every m eaning of a line — even they are still, as
human beings, trapped w ithin that set of beliefs that is
themself. For their decisions about what is true and im por
tant, their selection of events, eventually com es down to
what/eeZs im portant and w h a t feels true.
In this unsortable storm of belief, there is no such thing
as publicly verifiable truth, because there is no such thing
as perfect com munication, and without perfect com m uni
cation there is no verification. The doctrines o f the criticpriests are really an attem pt to surm ount this problem by
cutting story down to a m ore manageable thing: discourse.
Detached reading gives the reader the illusion of control
— the illusion that "good"w riters are in control of their
stories, the illusion that "good"readers can receive the
m eanings of those works. In fact, how ever, a detached
reading is not a reading of the story at all. The detached
reader is not allowing the writer to give him vicarious
m emory of events that w ere ordered by another hand.
Instead, the detached reader is continually rebuilding the
events and language of the story into his ow n safe and
com fortable discourse, w hich he knows he can deal with
because it is his alm ost unchanged self.
This m ethod works. But it is, if you w ill forgive the
term, escapist. The detached reader is escaping, not from
that set of fictions called reality, but from that m ost dan
gerous and fearful o f all things, the true story. The closest
thing to true com m unication betw een tw o hum an beings
is story-telling, for despite his best efforts at concealment,
a writer will inevitably reveal in his story the world he
believes he lives in, and the participatory reader w ill for
ever after carry around in him self and as him self a m em 
ory that was partly controlled by that other hum an being.
Such m emories are not neatly sorted into fiction and real
life in our minds. I know, of course, that I n ever stood at
the Cracks of Doom and watched G ollum die. But that
faith in the distinction betw een my ow n actions and the
actions of fictional characters is m erely another story I tell
myself. In fact, my m emory of that event is m uch clearer
and more powerful than my mem ory of m y fifth birthday.
You see why the critic-priests m ust shun participatory
reading, must deny it, must refuse it. Participatory reading
puts your very self at risk. It will and m ust change who
you are. This may be m uch of the reason w hy most people
never read stories at all after they leave adolescence. C on
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sciously or not, they do not wish to change, and so they
avoid an experience that will unavoidably change them.
The critic-priest, with his detached reading, does precisely
the same thing. He avoids the experience of reading a
story, in exchange for the experience of affirming the story
that he is a superior, elevated, fit, and above all non-bour
geois reader. It is a story that is not dissimilar to the story
of the divine right o f kings or the infallibility of popes: It
bestows power and privilege, provided that enough other
people believe it.
O f course, not one, not even a critic-priest, really reads
everything critickly. The emotional impact of believed sto
ries is at the heart of even the most detached of formal
criticism. Canonical texts are all right to believe. The
bludgeon of detached reading is only used w ith full force
against non-canonical stories — that is, against those very
stories which cannot possibly be comprehended by a
critickal reader. It is a catch-22: To be read with belief, a
story must be admitted to the canon of great or good
works; to be admitted to the canon, a story must be de
signed for critickal reading or already have such a strong
claim to greatness that critickal interpretations have been
forced upon it.
ion because it m ust be believed mythickly to have any
value at all. But fantasy is hardly alone in that exclusion.
All art that is, in H ulm e's definition, Romantic, and all
fiction that is Romance, belongs outside the courts of the
temple. Fantasy is certainly n ot identical with other sorts
of romance, or we would not be able to name the genre
and believe the name.
W e do not start out believing whatever the writer
throws at us in a story. Each genre and subgenre has its
own way of inducing us— or seducing us— to keep reading
long enough to believe. Importance and truth— that is
what we look for in all our reading of stories. W hen we
reject a story we usually do it because it failed in one of
those areas; because we did not believe it or because we
are bored. In coarser terms, we either say, "O h, yeah?"or
"So what?"
The writer, because he is telling a story that feels im 
portant and true to him, does not ask those questions of
himself. But the reader does not, a priori, agree with the
writer's assessment of what is important and true. There
fore the writer uses tricks to keep readers paying attention
for a while. Eventually the tricks break down, because they
are only illusions. Eventually the reader will decide, con
sciously or not, whether the story itself is true or im por
tant. But in the meantime, the tricks can keep working for
a long time.
In each genre there are ways of creating the illusion of
im portance and the illusion of truth. The critic-priests, in
fact, provide one of the most powerful machineries for
sustaining an illusion of im portance. How many people
would choose to read Henry James or Virginia Woolf if no
one told them that The Ambassadors or To the Lighthouse
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were pivotal or seminal works? This is not to say that these
novels are not really important or true, merely that they de
pend on the critical story about them for most of their readers.
Without that critical buttressing, most readers would give up
in despair by the time they reached James's thousandth
comma or the second page, whichever comes first.
In the genre of literary stories, the writers openly call
for that same critical approval. And to attract it, they create
the illusion of im portance primarily through im itating the
vices ofthe "great"novels. They make their works deliber
ately boring, put as much introspection between events as
possible, and in short im itate the conventions and forms of
their genre to signal to the reader that this is a work which
may well meet with approval from the oracle. Also, the
literary genre writer often tries for obscurity, forcing the
reader to probe for hidden meanings because there is no
detectable surface sense. In short, such works seduce the
reader into the rituals of critickal reading.
The literary genre also sets up the illusion of truth. In
the realistic novel, the writer spins a web of detail that
corresponds with verifiable contemporary experience.
The reader recognizes these details and they keep him
believing that what is going on h ere could happen in the
real world, that it is true. In the self-conscious novel, the
narrative voice is either mocking or mocked, undercutting
belief by drawing the reader to an ironic platform from
which author and reader together can despise error. This,
too, draws the reader into believing the author by accept
ing his choice of what to disbelieve.
How are the illusions of im portance and the illusions
of truth created in fantasy? W here the realistic novel de
pends upon recognition of details of contemporary life, the
fantasy writer has long depended on recognition of con
ventional devices. Because the writer is invoking events
that the reader has believed before, the reader is induced
to believe again. H owever, com petition with the novel has
forced the fantasy w riter to use both methods.
The conventions are still there, but a wealth of detail is
also provided. The detail in fantasy, however, does not
correspond with the contemporary experience. While the
causal relationships among events are recognizable, the
details create a world that is changed in certain im portant
respects — the possibility of magic, the distance from the
present time. Yet in the best realistic fashion, the m odem
fantasy writer gives us so m uch detail that the story seems
to be taking place in a real world. This works only because
the realistic novelist has taught readers to believe in de
tailed realities; but then, it was only necessary in fantasy
because the realistic novelist taught readers to expect de
tail and doubt whatever did not have it.
The illusion of truth, however, is not so im portant to
the fantasy reader as the illusion of im portance. The
critickal reader, in ridiculing fantasy, usually makes much
of the fact that the stories seem so pretentious. The charac
ters and the narrator so often speak in a formal, elevated
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language — U rsula LeG uin even considers this essential.
The stories always seem to be about a world-changing
struggle b etw een good and evil. A ll of civilization as we
know it seem s to hang in the balance.
But those elem ents are n ot u niversal in recent fantasy.
M ost m odem fantasy sustains the illusion of im portance
in other ways. O ne useful device, perhaps m ost effective
because this is a generally irreligious age, is ritual—not just
for magical purposes, b ut for purposes that can only be
called worship or celebration. The cerem onial honoring of
Frodo and Sam before King A ragorn is one such ritual, in
which each of them, given a new nam e and a new story, is
presented form ally to the people of the land for public
honor. One thinks also o f the parallel scene in Star Wars
and the honoring of Thomas Covenant as a hero in his own
world after his return from the land.
Another device that sustains the illusion of im portance
is one that troubles m any critics — the alm ost inevitable
cruelty of fantasy. V iolence alone is, indeed, an attentiongetting device. But the cruelty of the m ost powerful fanta
sies goes beyond m ere blood and thunder. In G ene W olfe's
Shadow o f the Torturer, the scenes of death are all ritualized,
and pain is a sacram ent; in Lord o f the Rings, too, Frodo is
made holy by his suffering, and his dismemberment be
comes part of his name. Stephen Donaldson's leper, Thomas
Covenant, lives in a ritual of self-protection, in constant fear
of unspeakable, insidious decay. There is something about
the ritualizing of suffering that makes it seem more impor
tant. In the story of Christ, it matters less that Jesus died than
that he chose to die, that his death was important to other
people, that it was excruciating and slow, that it followed
certain forms and certain words were said. A common form
of execution was turned into a holy and im portant thing
because of the way the story of it is given to us. These same
elements of ritualized cruelty are no less powerful in fantasy,
and so they are frequently invoked.
Behind the illusion of im portance however, fantasy
really is im portant to the believing reader. The point of
fantasy is not its novelty— the sam e conventions can be
endlessly repeated because w hat matters is not the event,
but the way the events are fit together and the im portance
that is given to them b y the characters. Losing a finger is
unfortunate; Frodo's losing a finger is his personal re
dem ption and the redem ption of the world. And yet as
soon as I express it in words like that, I have paraphrased
and turned it into discourse, and therefore removed its
effect. The power of fantasy is not in the fact that a sacrifice
has taken place, but that the participatory reader rem em 
bers the experience o f sacrificing. W hat m akes the Riddlemaster o fH ed im portant is not that there is an identity crisis
when God turns out to be the devil, b ut that I the reader
remem ber experiencing the terror of that moment, with
out com fortably nam ing it "identity crisis." It was myself
at risk, m yself who suffered. And the very subjectivity of
the experience m akes it resist the fashionable language of
criticism today.
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Does this m ean that all criticism o f fantasy is futile? O f
course not. W hat it m eans is that we m ust be aware that
the fashionable critical paradigm s are com pletely in appro
priate to fantasy— and to most fiction that real people like
to read. The M odernist epick is an assertion o f pow er over
all story-telling, and it m ust b e not ju st doubted b ut de
stroyed, and not just destroyed but replaced. It w ould be
foolish to replace it with another map to be laid over stories
to "m ake sen se"of them. It is the idea that one m ust m ake
sense o f stories at all that is harmful. Stories are sense, and
do not need to have anything m ade of them at all. C ritickal
reading of m ost stories is unintelligent unless it follows a
genuine m ythick or epick reading: It is tim e to stop cred
iting the criticism of those who have not read with belief.
It is time to propose new canons of great literature, new
methods of critical approach, and new purposes to be
accomplished in the exam ination of a text. The elitists have
sneered at good stories w ithout any answ ering scorn quite
long enough.
W hat sort of criticism is valid? Since every story is, in
a way, a revolutionary act, and since stories can b e pow 
erful forces for changing individuals, they inevitably have
m oral force and can be dangerous. Any critic w ho reads a
story that is morally detestable to him has a perfect right
to answer the story on those grounds. Since every writer
has different strategies for handling the illusions of truth
and of im portance, it is appropriate for a critic to call
attention to stories that offend his personal taste. That is,
after all, w hat I am doing right now. There is always room
for critical response to stories, as long as it is understood
that such responses are eccentric and w e do not allow any
one school of thought to have a privileged position— espe
cially not a school of thought stupid and arrogant enough
to consign an exceptionally vital and pow erful literature
to oblivion.
1?
["Fantasy and the Believing Reader" first appeared in Science Fiction Re
view vol. 11, no. 3, whole no. 44 (Aug. [Fall] 1982): 45-50. Rights to the
article are held by Orson Scott Card.]
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6 It is perhaps significant that according to Greek myth, the spider was
originally a woman who was turned into an insect for daring to
compete with Athena — the patron goddess of all "things devised by
mind or hand" — in her weaving ability (Atchity & Barber 25).
7 Although the oppositional relationship between Galadriel and Shelob
is commented on extensively, one of the more insightful and useful
explorations is Peter Damien Goselin's "Two Faces of Eve: Galadriel
and Shelob as Anima Figures".
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